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Financial globalization was off to a rocky start in emerging economies hit by Sudden Stops since the
mid 1990s. Foreign reserves grew very rapidly during this period, and hence it is often argued that
we live in the era of a New Merchantilism in which large stocks of reserves are a war-chest for defense
against Sudden Stops. We conduct a quantitative assessment of this argument using a stochastic intertemporal
equilibrium framework with incomplete asset markets in which precautionary saving affects foreign
assets via three mechanisms: business cycle volatility, financial globalization, and Sudden Stop risk.
In this framework, Sudden Stops are an equilibrium outcome produced by an endogenous credit constraint
that triggers Irving Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism. Our results show that financial globalization
and Sudden Stop risk are plausible explanations of the observed surge in reserves but business cycle
volatility is not. In fact, business cycle volatility has declined in the post-globalization period. These
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“An absurdity does not cease to be an absurdity when we have discovered 
what were the appearances which made it plausible; and the Merchantile 
Theory could not fail to be seen in its true character when man began to 
explore into the foundations of things, and seek their premises from 
elementary facts, and not from the form and phrases of common 
discourse” (J. S. Mill (1848), Principles of Political Economy, p.5)   
 
1.      Introduction 
 
  The early stages of financial globalization in emerging economies were characterized by 
a series of financial debacles and economic crises known as Sudden Stops. The indexes of 
capital account liberalization constructed by Edwards (2005) and Chinn and Ito (2005) show 
that financial globalization started in emerging economies in the late 1980s (see Figure 1). 
The waves of Sudden Stops that followed began with the Mexican crisis of 1994-95. Table 1 
lists 18 Sudden Stop episodes that occurred between 1994 and 2002. In addition, the period 
since the early 1990s witnessed a surge in foreign reserves in most Sudden Stop countries. As 
Table 1 shows, the median increase in reserves in these countries was 7.7 percent of GDP 
(measured as the cross-country median of the differences between each country’s average 
reserves-to-GDP ratio from the year of the country’s Sudden Stop to 2004 and the average 
from 1985 to the year of the Sudden Stop).
1 The increase was particularly sharp in the Asian 
Sudden Stop countries, where the median increase in reserves exceeded 13 percent of GDP!
2 
 
  A popular view in policy institutions and academic circles is that this large buildup of 
reserves represents a form of self-insurance that emerging economies have taken against the 
risk of future Sudden Stops. The argument is that Sudden Stop countries, having realized 
that the sudden loss of access to capital markets is a shortcoming of financial globalization, 
and aware of the limited financial mechanisms available to cope with Sudden Stops, opted 
for a New Merchantilism in which large holdings of reserves are a war-chest for defense 
against Sudden Stops. The studies by Aizenman and Lee (2007), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006), 
Caballero and Panageas (2005), Choi, Sharma and Stromqvist (2007), Jeanne and Ranciere 
(2006) and Jeanne (2007) examine key theoretical and empirical features of this New 
Merchantilism, and the potential to develop better insurance mechanisms. 
 
  This paper conducts a quantitative assessment of the New Merchantilism. We use a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework of optimal precautionary demand for 
foreign assets in a small open economy with incomplete asset markets. We quantify the 
effects of three key factors that drive precautionary savings in this framework: (1) changes in 
the business cycle volatility of output, (2) financial globalization (i.e., the reduction of 
                                          
1 In most Sudden Stop countries the change in reserves has been much larger than the change in net 
foreign assets indicating large portfolio shifts that are beyond the scope of this paper. Our focus is on 
how much of the increase in assets can be explained by precautionary motives. Still, portfolio 
considerations can be important for studying the surge in reserves (Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2006; Jeanne 
2007) and the dynamics of Sudden Stops (Durdu and Mendoza, 2006). 
2 Setting the breakpoint in the year of the Sudden Stop is not critical. Similar qualitative results 
showing a surge in reserves are obtained comparing average reserves of Sudden Stop countries for the 
1986-2004 period with those for the 1970-1985 period. Since 1985 is often viewed as the starting year 
of the globalization process, we can also say that reserves surged along with financial globalization.    
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distortions affecting international asset trading), and (3) self-insurance against the risk of 
Sudden Stops.  
 
  The analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage uses a canonical one-sector model of 
an endowment economy that faces non-insurable shocks in domestic income. These shocks 
are non-insurable because asset markets are incomplete, but the economy still has access to 
a frictionless credit market in which it can borrow or lend at the world’s risk-free interest 
rate. The model is calibrated to match the variability and persistence of output in Sudden 
Stop economies, and then used to compute the optimal short- and long-run dynamics of 
foreign assets triggered by changes in output volatility and financial globalization. 
       
  The second stage of the analysis studies a two-sector production economy with liability 
dollarization and endogenous Sudden Stops. The economy has a tradable-goods sector and a 
non-tradable goods sector, and nontradables are produced with imported intermediate goods 
(which are priced in world markets). Liability dollarization is present because non-state-
contingent debt is denominated in units of tradables. Here, we reexamine the adjustments in 
foreign assets driven by financial globalization and business cycle volatility under the 
assumption of a frictionless credit market. The main goal, however, is to quantify the 
increase in foreign assets that is justified by optimal self-insurance due to the risk of 
endogenous Sudden Stops. To this end, we introduce a collateral constraint that limits debt 
not to exceed a fraction of the value of total income in units of tradable goods. As Mendoza 
(2006a) explains, this credit-market imperfection causes endogenous Sudden Stops because of 
the strong amplification mechanism that results from combining liability dollarization with a 
Fisherian deflation of the relative price of nontradables. In this setup, the precautionary 
demand for foreign assets takes into account how foreign asset holdings alter the probability 
and the magnitude of Sudden Stops, both of which are equilibrium outcomes of the model. 
 
  The paper’s quantitative analysis yields three main findings: First, financial 
globalization, even without Sudden Stops, can trigger significant increases in mean foreign 
asset holdings. Second, the risk of Sudden Stops can also produce significant increases in 
foreign assets, even when the long-run variability of output is unaffected by Sudden Stops. 
Third, changes in output volatility cannot explain the observed surge in foreign reserves. 
The models predict large increases in foreign assets in response to higher variability of 
income. In the data, however, there is no evidence of systematic increases in the standard 
deviation of cyclical output for Sudden Stop economies in the era of financial globalization 
(see Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3). In some of these countries volatility increased, but in 
many others it fell and this is also the case for the mean and median of the group. Looking 
at sectoral GDP volatility, we do find that the tradables GDP of Sudden Stop countries 
became more volatile (see Table 3), but not by the magnitudes that the model would require 
to explain the observed surge in reserves. 
 
  Our model also yields an important result in terms of the dynamics associated with the 
surge in reserves: The large buildup of foreign assets in response to financial globalization or 
Sudden Stop risk is a slow, gradual process characterized by current account surpluses and 
undervalued real exchange rates. These dynamics do not require central bank intervention to 
target the real exchange rate in efforts to promote exports. Hence, our results can resolve 
the dichotomy dividing self-insurance-based explanations of the surge in reserves (Aizenman  
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and Lee, 2007) from those based on external surpluses and undervalued exchange rates 
(Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003). 
  
  Our framework yields predictions for precautionary savings under two specifications of 
intertemporal preferences that have not been compared before: the Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget, 
BAH, approach (which for a small open economy requires a constant, exogenous rate of time 
preference higher than the world interest rate) and the Uzawa-Epstein, UE, approach (which 
features an endogenous rate of time preference). The BAH approach is widely used in the 
precautionary savings literature, while the UE approach is often used in RBC models of 
small open economies with incomplete markets. Both approaches feature precautionary 
savings because agents build a buffer stock of savings to facilitate consumption smoothing. 
In particular, they assume that the marginal utility of consumption goes to infinity as 
consumption approaches zero, so agents are extremely averse to hold asset positions that 
leave them exposed to the risk of “very low” consumption at any point in time. However, 
the elasticity of mean foreign assets with respect to the interest rate differs sharply in the 
two approaches, and hence their quantitative implications for precautionary savings need to 
be studied separately. 
 
  The BAH approach requires a constant rate of time preference higher than the interest 
rate because, if the two rates are equal, optimal precautionary savings would imply 
accumulating an infinite amount of foreign assets: Agents desire a non-stochastic 
consumption stream, but they need an infinitely large buffer stock of assets to support it 
because income is stochastic and capital markets do not offer enough insurance instruments 
to diversify income risk fully. Mean foreign assets under this approach increase as the gap 
between the interest rate and the rate of time preference narrows, with mean foreign assets 
(and their elasticity) going to infinity as the rate of interest converges to the rate of time 
preference from below. Thus, at interest rates close to the rate of time preference, the BAH 
setup predicts that small variations in the interest rate trigger large adjustments in average 
foreign assets. By contrast, the UE approach models the rate of time preference as an 
increasing function of past consumption, but imposing conditions that limit the magnitude 
of this “impatience effect.” This approach yields a long-run rate of time preference that 
converges to the world interest rate in a non-degenerate equilibrium, and a well-behaved 
stochastic stationary state in which mean asset holdings are less sensitive to changes in the 
world real interest rate. In fact, in our quantitative experiments, the elasticity of mean 
foreign assets in the UE setup is approximately constant at high or low interest rates. 
 
  A contribution of our analysis is that the effects of business cycle volatility, financial 
globalization and Sudden Stop risk on foreign assets are examined within a common 
framework and under alternative preference specifications. The existing literature has 
produced interesting results by examining these factors separately. Fogli and Perri (2006) 
study a two-country model in which the Great Moderation (the decline in relative output 
volatility of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the world) leads to a build up of foreign 
assets in U.S. trading partners. The surge in foreign assets, however, is small relative to the 
magnitudes shown in Table 1. The Great Moderation has also resulted in higher output 
volatility of Sudden Stop economies relative to the United States, but driven largely by the 
moderation of U.S. business cycles—not by higher volatility in Sudden Stop economies (see 
Tables 2 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3). In our framework, this pattern of changes in relative 
volatility is akin to a permanent increase in the risk-free interest rate faced by Sudden Stop  
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economies, which causes them to increase assets holdings due to similar effects as those that 
result from financial globalization. Thus, the surge in reserves in this scenario is not the 
direct result of self-insurance against higher business cycle volatility inside Sudden Stop 
countries, but the indirect result of lower U.S. volatility on the world interest rate.  
  
  Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007) study how financial globalization affects 
foreign asset positions and their portfolio structure in a world composed of countries with 
varying degrees of financial development (i.e., asset market incompleteness) and inhabited 
by heterogenous agents that face non-insurable idiosyncratic risk. They find that financial 
integration leads to a large, gradual buildup of assets against the country with the highest 
degree of financial development. We focus instead on the implications of aggregate risk in a 
representative-agent small open economy, but our results are consistent with theirs in 
showing that financial globalization can lead to large increases in foreign asset holdings.  
 
  Mendoza (2002) and Durdu (2006) examine Sudden Stop models similar to the one 
studied here. Mendoza shows that when the model is calibrated to Mexican data, the shift 
from perfect credit markets to a world with Sudden Stops increases the average foreign 
assets-GDP ratio by 13.8 percentage points. Durdu examines how hedging and self-insurance 
options change with financial innovation in the form of GDP-indexed credit contracts.   
 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the one-sector model 
and examines its quantitative implications. Section 3 presents the two-sector model with 
liability dollarization and endogenous Sudden Stops. Section 4 concludes. 
2.   One-Sector Endowment Economy 
 
2.1  Structure of the Model 
 
  Consider a small open economy inhabited by a representative agent, who consumes a 
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Period utility has constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) form, with γ as the relative risk 
aversion coefficient. The time preference function v(c) takes one of two forms: (a) with the 
UE formulation, the rate of time preference is endogenous and given by  () l n ( 1 ) UE vc c ρ =+ , 
where  UE ρ >0 measures the elasticity of the rate of time preference with respect to 1+c; (b) 
with the BAH formulation, the rate of time preference is given by the standard constant 
fraction 0< BAH ρ <1 (i.e., the typical exogenous discount factor is  1/(1 ) BAH βρ ≡ + ). 
 
  The economy chooses consumption and foreign assets as to maximize (1) subject to the 
standard resource constraint: 
  1 (1 ) tt t t cy bbr A ε + = − ++ +  (2)  
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The economy’s mean or trend income, y, is subject to random shocks, εt, which follow a first-
order, irreducible Markov chain. Foreign assets, b, are one-period bonds traded in a 
frictionless global credit market. These bonds pay a net risk-free real interest rate equal to r 
(so the gross interest rate is given by R≡1+r). Given that in the data absorption includes 
investment and government expenditures, and not just private consumption, we introduce a 
constant lump-sum level of exogenous absorption A that will allow us to calibrate the model 




  The optimization problem of this small open economy is analogous to the optimization 
problem of a single individual in the heterogenous-agents models of precautionary savings 
(e.g., Aiyagari, 1994 or Hugget, 1993). As in those models, CRRA utility implies that the 
marginal utility of consumption goes to infinity as consumption goes to zero from above, 
making the economy “extremely averse” to consumption and savings plans that would leave 
it exposed to the risk of “very low” consumption at any date and state of nature. To rule 
out these plans, agents in this economy impose on themselves Aiyagari’s Natural Debt Limit, 
by which they never borrow more than the annuity value of the worst realization of income: 
1 min( )/ tt by A r ε + ≥− + . In addition, following Aiyagari (1994), we can impose an ad-hoc 
debt limit φ such that  1 min( )/ tt by A r φε + ≥≥ − + . 
 
  The optimality condition of the economy’s maximization problem is: 
  [ ] ( ) exp( ( )) [ ( 1)] 1 ct t c Ut v c E Ut r = − ++  (3) 
Note that  () c Ut denotes the lifetime marginal utility of date-t consumption. In the BAH 
setup,  () c Ut is just the standard period marginal utility of ct. In the UE setup, however, 
() c Ut includes both the period marginal utility of ct and the impatience effects by which 
changes in ct affect the subjective discounting of all future utility flows after date t. 
 
  A competitive equilibrium for this small open economy is defined by stochastic 
sequences[ ] 1 0 , tt t cb
∞
+ = that satisfy the Euler equation (3) and the resource constraint (2) for all 
t. The structure of asset markets has important implications for this equilibrium. If the 
economy has access to complete insurance markets to fully diversify away all the risk of 
domestic income fluctuations, the equilibrium would feature a constant consumption stream 
and the economy’s wealth position vis-à-vis the rest of the world would be time and state 
invariant. If the asset market is limited to non-state-contingent bonds, however, the wealth 
position changes over time and across states of nature, and consumption cannot attain a 
perfectly smooth path. With BAH preferences, the economy attains a well-defined long-run 
distribution of foreign assets (i.e., a well-defined stochastic stationary equilibrium), only 
if [ ] 11 r β +< .
3 With UE preferences, a well-defined long-run distribution of assets exists if 
                                          
3 In this case, the marginal benefit of an extra unit of foreign assets follows a non-negative 
supermartingale that converges almost surely to a nonnegative random variable (see Ch. 17 in 
Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004). Thus, convergence is attained with the marginal benefit of savings  
remaining finite and moving randomly in the long run, and hence the long-run averages of assets and 
consumption also remain finite. In contrast, with  (1 ) 1 r β + ≥ , assets diverge to infinity in the long 
run because marginal utility converges to zero almost surely, and with CRRA preferences this implies 
that consumption, and hence assets, diverge to infinity.  
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UE ργ ≤  (see Epstein, 1983). That is, UE preferences limit the size of impatience effects by 
requiring the elasticity of the rate of time preference with respect to consumption not to 
exceed the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
4 
 
  The competitive equilibrium of the economy can be characterized in recursive form in 
terms of a decision rule for bonds at date t+1, b′(b,ε), as a deterministic function of date-t 
assets b and the date-t realization of income ε, that solves the following Bellman equation: 
 
1
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⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ′′ =+ − ⎨⎬ ⎪⎪ − ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
′ = − ++
 (4) 
In the quantitative analysis that follows, we solve this Bellman equation using value 
function iteration. Foreign assets take values defined over a discrete grid with n nodes: 
{} 12 ( , ) ... n bb B b b b ′ ∈ =< < <. We set n=1000 to reduce numerical approximation error in 
the decision rule. The Markov process of income is defined by a vector of j realizations, 
{} 12 ... j εε εε ∈Ε=< < < and an jxj  transition probability matrix,  1 (| ) tt πε ε + . We use 
Tauchen and Hussey’s (1991) quadrature algorithm (THQA) to transform time-series 




  The baseline calibration of the model is designed so that the deterministic stationary 
equilibrium using UE preferences matches a set of statistics from the Mexican economy, 
including the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. The calibration to Mexico is not critical for 
our key findings. As we discuss later, the results of sensitivity analysis show that our 
findings are robust to changes in parameters and in the variability and persistence of output 
in the range of those observed in the countries listed in Table 1.  
 
  The BAH setup does not have a well-defined deterministic stationary equilibrium, since 
without uncertainty  1 R β <  implies that consumption falls at a gross rate of ( )1/ R
γ β until 
the economy hits the debt limit φ. Hence, to complete the calibration of the BAH setup we 
keep all the parameters as in the UE setup and set φ and β to values such that the model 
with BAH preferences matches the long-run average of foreign assets and the cyclical 
standard deviation of consumption in the data. 
 
  The baseline calibration parameters are listed in Table 5. The coefficient of relative risk 
aversion is set to γ=2, which is the standard value in quantitative dynamic general 
equilibrium models. The mean of income is normalized to y=1 without loss of generality. 
Hence, the steady-state allocations can be interpreted as ratios relative to average GDP. The 
steady-state ratio of net foreign assets to GDP is set to -44 percent (b=-.44), which is the 
average of Mexico’s net foreign assets-GDP ratio over the period 1985-2004 in the database 
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The consumption-GDP ratio is set to 69.2 
                                          
4 Foreign assets converge to a well-defined long-run distribution because the rate of time preference 
increases (decreases) relative to the interest rate if consumption and assets rise (fall) too much in the 
long run, and this changes incentives for savings in favor of reducing (increasing) asset holdings.  
  -7- 
percent (c=0.692), in line with the average consumption-output ratio in Mexican data. The 
real interest rate is set to 5.9 percent (R=1.059), which is the average of Uribe and Yue’s 
(2006) real interest rate including the EMBI spread for Mexico. The model does not take 
into account default risk, but since the real interest rate is constant, it seems more 
reasonable to set it at a constant representative of the effective financing cost of Mexico’s 
foreign debt than to set it equal to the real interest rate on U.S. T-Bills. Given the values of 
y, c, b and R, the resource constraint implies that A=y+b(R-1)-c=0.282. 
 
  In the UE setup, the value of the time preference elasticity follows from the steady-state 
condition that sets the rate of time preference equal to R:  ln( )/ln(1 ) 0.109 UE Rc ρ =+ = . This 
implies a subjective discount factor of  0.109 (1 ) 0.944 c − += . In the BAH setup, we match 
Mexico’s average net foreign assets of -44 percent and the standard deviation of consumption 
over the business cycle (3.28 percent) by setting φ =-0.51 and β=0.94, which implies 
0.064 BAH ρ = . Notice that in theory, for any given φ <-0.44, there is a value of β high 
enough so that the model with BAH preferences yields an average of assets of -44 percent. 
However, we found that for φ <-1, the values of β that can yield this mean of assets result in 
stochastic steady states that assign non-trivial probabilities to very high debt ratios larger 
than 100 percent of GDP, and the variability of consumption exceeds the actual measure by 
large margins. The Lane-Milesi Ferretti database shows that emerging economies (defined as 
middle income developing countries) very rarely reach net foreign asset positions larger than 
GDP. On the other hand, with tight ad-hoc debt limits of 50 percent of GDP or less, the 
long-run distribution of assets predicts that the economy spends most of the time at the 
debt limit (i.e., the long-run probability of observing b=φ is “too high”). 
  
  The Markov process of income shocks is set to match the standard deviation and first-
order autocorrelation of the Hodrick-Prescott-filtered cyclical component of GDP in annual 
Mexican data for the 1965-2005 period ( 3.301% y σ =  and  0.597 y ρ =  respectively). The HP 
filter ensures that cyclical GDP follows a stationary process, and the AR(1) specification 
( 1 ty t t yy e ρ − =+ ) cannot be rejected. Thus, the underlying standard deviation of output 
innovations is  22 (1 ) 2.648 ey y σσρ = − = percent. Using 5 nodes in the vector of realizations, 
THQA produces a Markov process for ε that yields 3.285 percent standard deviation in 
output with 0.550 autocorrelation and 2.64 percent standard deviation in output 
innovations. Hence, the Markov process is an accurate approximation to the actual time-
series process of Mexico’s cyclical GDP. 
 
  Before reviewing the quantitative findings, it is important to explain how precautionary 
savings are measured. Precautionary savings are defined as the savings that agents 
accumulate due to the presence of non-insurable idiosyncratic risk. Hence, precautionary 
savings are usually measured as the difference between the long-run average of assets 
predicted by a model and the level of assets that the same model would predict in the long 
run in the absence of uncertainty. In the BAH setup, this is the excess of the average assets 
in the stochastic steady state relative to the debt limit φ, because without uncertainty the 
BAH economy reduces its asset position until it hits φ. In contrast, precautionary savings in 
the UE setup is the excess of the long-run average of assets relative to a well-defined 
deterministic steady state obtained by equating the endogenous rate of time preference with 
the world interest rate. Because of this difference in the deterministic steady state of assets 
in the BAH and UE setups, it can also be informative to study changes in precautionary 
asset holdings by simply comparing long-run averages of foreign assets.  
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2.4 Baseline  Results 
 
  Table 6 lists the statistical moments that characterize the stochastic steady state of the 
model under the baseline calibration for UE and BAH preferences. The table also shows 
results for alternative calibrations with higher output autocorrelation (ρy=0.7), higher and 
lower variability in output innovations (σe=4 percent and σe =2 percent, which yield σy=5 
percent and σy =2.5 percent respectively) and higher risk aversion (γ =5). 
 
  The business cycle moments listed in the Baseline column of Table 6 are standard 
findings in intertemporal models of small open, endowment economies with incomplete asset 
markets. Consumption behavior is consistent with typical business cycle features: 
consumption is slightly less volatile than output, it displays positive correlation with GDP 
and positive serial autocorrelation. On the other hand, since precautionary asset demand 
with the aim of smoothing consumption is the main driving force of foreign asset dynamics 
in the model, the cyclical behavior of net exports and the current account is counterfactual. 
In particular, both external accounts are strongly positively correlated with output, while 
actual business cycles display countercyclical external accounts. We show in Section 3 that 
this result is reversed in the two-sector model with production. 
 
  The main result in Table 6 relates to the stock of precautionary savings. The Baseline 
results show that under UE preferences precautionary savings measure nearly 2.5 percent of 
GDP. Under BAH preferences, however, precautionary savings are nearly 5 times larger at 
9.6 percent of GDP. The Baseline business cycle moments under both preferences 
specifications show important differences as a result. In particular, foreign assets fluctuate 
significantly more, are less correlated with output, and display higher serial autocorrelation 
in the UE setup than in the BAH setup. This is because the BAH setup matches Mexico’s 
average net foreign assets-GDP ratio in the data by imposing an ad-hoc debt limit of 51 
percent of GDP, and the probability of hitting it in the long run is 10.2 percent. Notice also 
that these significant differences in the characteristics of the stochastic steady states of the 
two setups are obtained with small differences in the behavior of the subjective discount 
factors. On average, the discount factors of the BAH and UE setup are virtually identical, 
and in the UE setup the standard deviation of the endogenous discount factor is very small, 
at about 4 percent of the variability of output. However, the endogenous discount factor is 
negatively correlated with GDP (since consumption is procyclical) and its fluctuations are 
highly persistent. 
 
  Table 6 shows that changes in the variability and persistence of output and in the 
degree of risk aversion preserve the qualitative features of the comparison across the BAH 
and UE Baseline results with small quantitative changes. Increases in ρy, σe and γ produce 
significant increases in precautionary savings, but the BAH setup always produces a larger 
stock of precautionary savings than the UE specification. With the autocorrelation of output 
at 0.7 or the standard deviation of output at 5 percent, precautionary savings in the BAH 
setup are about 4 times larger than in the UE setup, but the factor is just a little above 2 
with the coefficient of relative risk aversion set at 5. The high-risk-aversion case is also the 
one that yields the largest precautionary savings in both setups (10.4 and 23.8 percent of 
GDP in the UE and BAH specifications respectively). Note also that both the UE and the 
BAH setups can generate outcomes in which consumption variability exceeds income 
variability (by about 8 percent in the simulations with ρy =0.7 and up to 25 percent in the  
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UE scenario with γ=5). Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) identified consumption variability 
in excess of income variability as a puzzling feature of the data of emerging economies (see 
also Table 2). Our results suggest that self-insurance under incomplete asset markets may 
help explain this puzzle. 
 
  The high serial autocorrelation coefficients of foreign assets reported in Table 6 (0.99 in 
the UE baseline, 0.959 in the BAH baseline) indicate that the adjustment of foreign assets to 
its long-run average in the stochastic steady state is a slow, gradual process under both 
preference specifications. Figures 4-5 illustrate further this slow convergence. Figure 4 shows 
the transitional dynamics of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of foreign assets in 
the BAH and UE Baseline simulations, starting from the lowest asset position with 
nontrivial probability in the stochastic steady state. The intuition is that as the economy’s 
business cycle evolves, this is the lowest asset position that can be reached with positive 
probability in the long run. Once the economy hits this lowest asset position, the plots show 
the evolution of the CDFs of foreign assets as the economy returns to the stochastic steady 
state. The plots show CDFs after 2, 5, 10, and 15 years and also the long-run CDFs. Clearly, 
even after 15 years the CDFs are still distant from the long-run distributions.  
 
  Figure 5 shows the transitional dynamics of the foreign assets-GDP ratio in the Baseline 
simulations, plotted in percent relative to long-run averages. The transitional dynamics are 
computed as the forecast functions of the equilibrium Markov process of the foreign assets-
GDP ratio conditional on initial conditions for which: (a) foreign assets take the lowest 
value with positive long-run probability; and (b) the income shock is neutral (i.e., ε=1). The 
plots show that convergence to the long-run average of assets takes about 40 years in the 
BAH setup and more than 80 years in the UE setup. Note, however, that while the initial 
condition for the BAH plot is a foreign assets-GDP ratio nearly 10 percentage points below 
the long-run average, with a long-run probability of 10.2 percent (which corresponds to the 
debt limit, φ), the initial condition for the UE plot is a ratio nearly 48 percentage points 
below the long-run average and with a long-run probability of only 0.1 percent. The two 
initial conditions defined by the criterion of having the “lowest positive long-run 
probability” are therefore different in the UE and BAH setups. Hence, Figures 4-5 show that 
convergence is slow in both models, but comparisons across the BAH and UE plots need to 
keep in mind this caveat.   
 
2.5  Self-Insurance and Business Cycle Volatility 
 
  How much do changes in the cyclical variability of output affect foreign asset positions 
in the long run via self-insurance motives? Figure 6a shows the increase in precautionary 
savings as σe rises so that the standard deviation of GDP rises from 1 to 8 percent (keeping 
the serial autocorrelation of GDP constant).  Figure 6b is a similar plot but for increases in 
the autocorrelation of GDP from 0 to 0.8. In this case we keep σe constant but the standard 
deviation of GDP still increases as its autocorrelation rises (since  22 2 /(1 ) yy ε σσ ρ = − ).  
 
  Figures 6a shows that increases in output variability produce large increases in 
precautionary demand for foreign assets regardless of the preferences specification (although 
the BAH setup always yields higher precautionary savings than the UE setup). Figure 6b 
shows similar qualitative results when the autocorrelation of GDP rises, but quantitatively 
the effects on precautionary savings are weaker. If we examine the long-run averages of  
  -10- 
foreign asset-GDP ratios instead of precautionary savings, the UE setup produces larger 
(smaller) mean asset positions than the BAH setup at lower (higher) levels of output 
variability, but the elasticity of the average assets-GDP ratio to changes in the variability 
and persistence of output is higher with BAH preferences than with UE preferences. 
 
  Unfortunately, the data cast serious doubt on the hypothesis that foreign reserves have 
increased sharply in Sudden Stop countries because of increased output variability (see 
Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3). Figure 2 shows that output volatility is lower in the post-
globalization period in more than half of the Sudden Stop countries. Figure 3 shows that the 
mean and median standard deviation of output in 20-year rolling windows have changed 
slightly in the 3 to 4.5 percent range, and in fact they have been in a steady decline since 
the late 1990s. Table 2 shows that the median standard deviation of GDP in Sudden Stop 
countries for the full 1965-2005 period is about 3.5 percent, and this volatility measure fell 
from 3.5 percent before the Globalization period (1965-1985) to 3.1 percent in the 
Globalization period (1986-2005). Hence, in several countries volatility fell rather than 
increased, and in this case the model predicts a reduction in foreign assets. Even for the 
subset of countries where volatility rose, only in the extreme cases of Peru and Thailand 
(which show the largest increases in volatility of about 3.5 percentage points before and after 
Globalization) we find evidence of volatility increases of the magnitude that can account for 
the observed increases in reserves reported in Table 1. Figure 6b indicates that the model 
with UE (BAH) preferences needs an increase in output volatility of more than 4 (1.5) 
percentage points to account for the observed surge in reserves as a result of self insurance.  
 
  We conclude from this analysis that while increases in the cyclical volatility of output 
can produce large increases in foreign asset positions, the evidence in the data does not show 
that output variability has increased sharply and systematically across Sudden Stop 
countries. Hence, higher long-run business cycle volatility does not seem a plausible 
explanation of the surge in reserves in these countries. 
 
2.6  Financial Globalization Effects on Foreign Assets 
 
  We study next the effects of financial globalization on foreign asset holdings and 
precautionary savings. To this end, we introduce into the model a time-invariant 
distortionary tax on foreign asset returns at rate τ that is intended to represent the 
combined effect of all forms of controls on capital account transactions and global asset 
trading costs proportional to asset returns. The revenue or outlays generated by this 
“effective tax” (depending on whether b is positive or negative) are rebated to agents as a 
lump sum transfer Tt  =  btrτ, but agents take Tt as given. Thus, the agents’ budget 
constraint is now [ ] 1 1( 1) tt t t t cy bbr T A ετ + = − ++ − ++ . The resource constraint of the 
economy remains as in eq. (2).  
 
  For the economy with BAH preferences, we can still write the recursive competitive 
equilibrium as the solution of a single Bellman equation by taking advantage of the fact that 
the equilibrium of the economy distorted by τ is equivalent to that of an economy without 
distortions but with a lower discount factor. In particular, if we define τ
R as the tax on R 
equivalent to the corresponding tax on r (i.e., the value of τ
R  that satisfies 
(1 ) 1 (1 ) R Rr ττ − =+ − , which is  / R rR ττ = ), the competitive equilibrium is given by the 
same Bellman equation as in (4) but with the discount factor set as exp( ( ))(1 ) R vc τ −− . This  
  -11- 
equivalence does not hold for the UE setup because of the endogenous discount factor. In 
this case, however, we approximate the recursive competitive equilibrium by solving  eq. (4) 
subject to the following budget constraint:  [ ] 1( 1) cy b b r r b A ετ τ ′ = − ++− ++ . This 
formulation uses a time-invariant lump sum transfer set at rb τ , where b is the long-run 
average of foreign assets. This guarantees that at the average of the stochastic steady state 
the solution of the Bellman equation for the model with UE preferences satisfies the 
optimality conditions of the competitive equilibrium, and for values of b other than b it 
reduces the size of the wealth effects that would be introduced by ignoring the lump-sum 
rebate and simply using the resource constraint as in (2). We checked the accuracy of this 
approximation by applying it to the model with BAH preferences and then comparing the 
results with the exact competitive equilibrium solutions obtained using the tax-adjusted 
discount factor. For values of  0.84 τ ≤  the two algorithms yield average asset-GDP ratios 
that are at most 1/10 of a percent apart. 
 
  We consider tax rates that range from 0 to 27 percent, and we adjust the calibration so 
that at a zero tax rate the BAH setup approaches the complete-markets equilibrium (i.e., we 
set β=1/R, so that the domestic rate of time preference matches the world interest rate). 
Hence, in this case the lack of financial integration (which implies nonzero values of τ) 
represents also the “severity” of market incompleteness, as reflected in the gap between the 
tax-adjusted rate of time preference and the world real interest rate.  
 
  Figure 7a and 7b plot the long-run averages of foreign assets and precautionary savings 
against the tax on capital flows under both BAH and UE preferences. For the BAH setup, 
we show curves for three values of φ:  the natural debt limit, φ = -2, and φ = -1 (which 
imply limits of -200 and  -100 percent of average GDP respectively). As the tax approaches 
zero, b and precautionary savings go to infinity because we approach βR(1-τ
k)=1 and agents 
desire an infinity amount of self-insurance. Conversely, at high tax rates the relationship 
between taxes and mean asset holdings vanishes as the economy spends most of the time at 
the debt limit. This occurs at tax rates in excess of 10 percent for all three scenarios of φ. In 
contrast, at tax rates between 0.5 and 10 percent, the BAH setup predicts that the long-run 
average b/y ratio increases sharply as the tax falls even by small amounts. Thus, this setup 
predicts that in the early stages of financial globalization foreign assets may respond little to 
the opening of the capital account, while later on, further financial integration efforts that 
may imply small changes in effective distortions on asset trading (small changes in τ) 
produce large changes in the long-run average of b/y. These effects are the strongest if the 
only limit on debt is the natural debt limit. In this case, a cut in τ from 8 percent to 0.5 
percent increases the mean b/y ratio from -10 times GDP to about -154 percent of GDP, 
and precautionary savings rise from 81 percent to about 9.4 times GDP. But the effects are 
still large with much tighter debt limits. With φ=-1, the same tax cut increases average b/y 
from -90 percent to a positive position of about 20 percent of GDP, and precautionary 
savings rise from 10 to 120 percent of GDP. 
 
  The effects of financial globalization using UE preferences also show large increases in 
the long-run average of the ratio of foreign assets to GDP. In this case, cutting τ from 8 to 
0.5 percent increases the long-run average of foreign assets from -156 percent of GDP to 
almost -45 percent of GDP. On the other hand, precautionary savings are approximately 
unchanged. This result highlights a key difference between the BAH and UE preference 
specifications: When τ changes, the UE setup separates the savings effect resulting from the  
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increase in the post-tax return on assets even without uncertainty (i.e., the deterministic 
steady state of b rises as τ falls because the return to savings rises and the rate of time 
preference adjusts accordingly), from the effect due solely to precautionary savings (i.e., the 
effect on the excess of mean foreign asset holding in the stochastic model relative to the 
deterministic steady state). In the BAH setup the two effects cannot be separated because 
the deterministic steady state is invariant to the tax (since without uncertainty assets fall 
until they hit φ for any τ>0). Thus, while the model predicts large increases in foreign assets 
as a result of financial globalization under both BAH and UE preferences, the results of the 
UE setup suggest that the fraction that can be attributed to precautionary savings per se 
could be small. 
 
  Two important additional observations should be noted about these results. First, 
whether financial globalization is a good explanation of the observed surge in reserves in 
Sudden Stop economies depends on the timing and magnitude of the removal of barriers to 
international asset trading (i.e., how high was τ when globalization started and how much 
has it fallen). Certainly, the results in Figures 7a-b indicate that if Sudden Stop economies 
have moved closer to a regime of unrestricted global asset trading (as the indicators in 
Figure 1 suggest), the expected increases in foreign assets can be easily as large as those 
observed in the data. Second, the results also depend on the degree of completeness of the 
global capital markets that can be accessed with financial globalization. The exercise in this 
Section assumes that in the BAH setting, τ=0 implies that those global capital markets 
provide perfect insurance. In contrast, the results under the UE specification maintain 
market incompleteness even when τ=0. The fact that both specifications predict large 
increases in foreign assets as financial globalization strengthens suggests that the strong 
assumption of market completeness at τ=0 is the BAH setup is not critical for the result. 
The large differences in precautionary savings across the BAH and UE setups, however, do 
hinge on this assumption. 
 
  The large increase in the long-run average of foreign assets as a result of financial 
integration, and the slow transitional dynamics of foreign assets documented earlier, echo 
the results of Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007). However, the results are driven by 
different mechanisms in the two studies. Mendoza et al. obtain their results because of the 
adjustments in the within-country and cross-country distributions of wealth of two countries 
with different degrees of market incompleteness. As the countries move from financial 
autarky to financial globalization, the risk-free interest rate rises relative to autarky for the 
less-financially-developed country, and this rise alters precautionary savings behavior across 
individuals within the country leading to an increase in aggregate net foreign assets. 
Wealthy agents that save reap the gains of this increase, while poor agents that borrow are 
made significantly worse off. There is no aggregate risk but their model is calibrated to the 
observed variability of household earnings and firm profits, which is substantially higher 
than overall GDP variability. In contrast, our results focus only on aggregate uncertainty 
and the savings response of a single representative agent. 
 
  In summary, we find that financial globalization can be an important force driving the 
sharp increase in foreign reserves in Sudden Stop economies (and in emerging economies in 
general). The role of “pure” precautionary savings, however, is not as clear because we can 
get results in the setup with UE preferences where the large increase in foreign assets is due 
to the increased incentives for saving in foreign assets even in the absence of uncertainty.   
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3.    Two-Sector Production Economy 
 
 
3.1  Structure of the Model 
 
  The two-sector model differs from the one-sector model in four key respects: 
 
(I)  Consumption includes tradable goods (c
T) and nontradable goods (c
N) with aggregate 
consumption defined by a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function: 
  () ()
1
(, ) ( 1 ) , 0 , 1 . TN T N
tt t t cc c a c a c a
μ μ μ μ
− − − ⎡⎤ =+ − > ≥− ⎣⎦  (5) 
The elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables is given by 1/(1+μ), and 
the CES weighting factor is given by a. 
  
(II) Nontradable goods are produced by a representative firm using imported intermediate 
goods (m) as the single variable input of a neoclassical production technology: 
  ,0 1 . N
tt t yz Z m α α = ≤≤ (6) 
Z represents the trend level of total factor productivity (TFP) and it also includes the effects 
of any fixed factors, zt is a stochastic TFP shock, and α is the share of imported inputs in 
gross output. The domestic market of nontradable goods and the world market of 
intermediate goods are competitive, and thus the profit-maximizing demand for imported 
inputs is given by a standard marginal productivity rule: 
  1 Nm
ttt pz Z m p α α − =  (7) 
In this expression, p
m represents the world-determined price of imported inputs relative to 
tradable consumer goods, which is kept constant for simplicity, and N
t p denotes the price of 
nontradables relative to tradables, which is determined inside the small open economy. At 
equilibrium, this price must also match the household’s marginal rate of substitution 
between tradables and nontradables: 








μ + ⎛⎞ − ⎟ ⎜ = ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠
 (8) 
(III) The economy has new budget and resource constraints. The budget constraint of 
households in the competitive equilibrium is: 
  1
TN NT TTNN N
tt t t tt t t cp c yA p Ab b R επ + + = +++ − +  (9) 
where  NN N m
tt t t py pm π = −   represents profits from firms in the nontradables sector. The 
technology in (6) has decreasing returns, and profits are positive and equal to 1-α of the 
value of nontradables output. These profits are also equal to the value of nontradables GDP 
in units of tradables (i.e., gross output minus the cost of intermediate goods). The 
endowment of tradables is stochastic, so the economy now faces two Markov shocks, one 
hitting tradables output and one hitting TFP in nontradables. Given the firm’s optimality 
condition (7), the definition of profits, and market clearing in the nontradables sector, it 
follows that the sectoral resource constraints are:  
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  () 1 1 TT T Tm
tt t t t cy b b r A p m ε + = − ++ + −  (10) 
  NNN
tt cyA =+ (11) 
Constraint (10) assumes that foreign assets are denominated in units of tradables, so this 
economy displays liability dollarization (when it borrows, its debt is in units of tradables).  
 
(IV) We consider the possibility that agents face a collateral constraint in asset markets. In 
particular, lenders limit credit to a fraction κ of the market value of the total income of 




tt t by κε π + ⎡ ⎤ ≥− + ≥Ω ⎣ ⎦  (12) 
The value of income in the right-hand-side of (12) is equal at equilibrium to the economy’s 
total GDP valued at tradables goods prices, so (12) can be viewed as a constraint on the 
economy’s debt-GDP ratio. The constraint is endogenous, however, because the bond 
position and the price and production of nontradables are endogenous, and there is feedback 
between borrowing decisions and the value of nontradables GDP (as explained below). 
 
  It is critical to note that agents take as given the price of nontradables. Hence, they do 
not internalize the effect of their consumption and bond decisions on the equilibrium price, 
and therefore the effects of changes in the equilibrium price and production of nontradables 
on the ability to borrow are also not internalized. As a result, the model features a credit-
market externality by which individual choices affect the economy’s ability to borrow (see 
Uribe, 2006 and Korinek, 2007). 
 
3.2  Equilibrium and Amplification with Debt-Deflation 
 
  The characteristics of the equilibrium of the one-sector economy described in 2.2 extend 
to the two-sector economy. In particular, the CES aggregator preserves the Inada condition 
that makes period marginal utility go to infinity as c
T or c
N go to zero from above. Hence, 
agents will self-insure to rule out stochastic intertemporal sequences that could expose them 
to the risk of “very low” consumption of tradables. The natural debt limit that guarantees 
this outcome is 1 min( )/ TT T m
tt t by A p m r ε + ≥− + − .
6 Since tradables income is only a fraction 
of total income, this natural debt limit is tighter than the one in the one-sector economy. 
The agents may also face a higher degree of market incompleteness inasmuch as there is no 
vehicle to self-insure directly against the risk of fluctuations in nontradables income. 
Endogenous changes in the price and output of nontradables can, however, provide implicit 
insurance depending on how substitutable are tradables and nontradables in consumption 
                                          
5 This rules out equilibria in which the constraint could be satisfied at very high debt levels that prop 
up c
T and p
N. For example, Ω could be set at the debt that would be contracted without credit 
constraints (i.e., creditors do not lend more than what they would have without the constraint).  
6 Note that agents take profits and the price of nontradables as given, so their individual natural debt 
limit is  1 min( )/ TT T N N N
tt t t by A p A r επ + ≥− +++ , but with this debt limit there could still be 
equilibrium sequences where tradables consumption is nonpositive. The resource constraint (10) 
implies that at equilibrium the natural debt limit must be  1 min( )/ . TT T m
tt t by A p m r ε + ≥− + −   
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(i.e., on the value of μ) and on the equilibrium correlation between nontradables and 
tradables income (both valued at tradables goods prices). 
 
  The collateral constraint (12) introduces a borrowing limit that is “occasionally 
binding.” As explained in Mendoza (2005) and (2006a), in the states in which this constraint 
binds, the Euler equation for tradables consumption includes an endogenous Lagrange 
multiplier ηt that represents the shadow value of the credit limit: 
  () e x p [ ( ( , ) ) ] [ ( 1 ) ] TT TN
tt t t cc Ut v C c c E Ut R η = − ++  (13) 
If we define the effective interest rate as ( ) 1 () / e x p [ ( ( , ) ) ] [ ( 1 ) ] TT TN
tt t t cc RU t v C c c E U t + ≡− +  , it 
follows that the binding credit constraint adds an interest rate premium equal to 
( ) 1 [] / e x p [ ( ( , ) ) ] [ ( 1 ) ] T TN
tt t t t tc ER R v Cc c EU t η + − = − +  . This premium can be interpreted as the 
premium that lenders would charge borrowers in order to ensure that the credit constraint is 
not violated. In turn, the justification for the constraint could be limited contract 
enforcement by which lenders can confiscate only κ of a defaulting borrower’s total income. 
 
  Suppose that the economy has just enough debt so that an adverse shock of standard 
magnitude triggers the credit constraint. Tradables consumption falls because agents cannot 
borrow as much as they wanted. In turn, at the “initial” level of nontradables output, the 
decline in tradables consumption makes the price of nontradables fall. But as this price falls 
so does the value of the marginal product of imported inputs, and hence demand for these 
inputs and the output of nontradables fall. Up to this point, the credit transmission 
mechanism is similar to the one widely studied in Sudden Stop models with balance sheet 
effects (e.g., Calvo, 1998). If the price and output of nontradables fall, however, the value of 
the total income in units of tradables falls, tightening the constraint further and setting in 
motion Irving Fisher’s (1933) classic debt-deflation amplification mechanism.
7 
 
  The possibility of endogenous Sudden Stops strengthens precautionary savings 
incentives.
8 Sudden Stops and the probability of Sudden Stops are endogenous, so agents 
make optimal self-insurance plans taking into account the endogenous link between choices 
of foreign asset holdings and the magnitude and likelihood of Sudden Stops. As a result, the 
economy builds a buffer stock of savings so as to minimize the risk of landing in states of 
nature in which debt is high enough for a Sudden Stop to trigger massive consumption 
collapses. Hence, we should expect the economy with Sudden Stops to converge to a higher 
average of foreign assets than without Sudden Stops. In the quantitative analysis that 
follows we explore the differences between these two environments.  
 
  The equilibrium of the two-sector economy in recursive form is characterized by a 
decision rule for t+1 foreign assets, b′(b, ε
T, z), as a deterministic function of date-t assets 
and the date-t realization of shocks, that solves this Bellman equation: 
                                          
7 Mendoza (2005) provides an illustrative deterministic example of this mechanism. He shows that the 
Fisherian deflation converges to a unique equilibrium that amplifies balance sheet effects, resulting in 
much larger adjustments in debt, consumption and the nontradables price than a setup with balance 
sheet effects but no Fisherian deflation. 
8 Aizenman and Lee (2007) derive an analytical result with similar features in a Diamond-Dybvig-
style model. They showed that a discrete liquidity shock increases the need for precautionary savings.  
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 (14) 
As in the case of the one-sector model, we solve this Bellman equation for both the BAH 
and UE discount factors using value function iteration.
9 The grid of bond values B has 1000 
evenly-spaced nodes. The Markov process of shocks includes shocks to tradables GDP, which 
are in the set  { } 12 ... TT T T
j εε ε ε ∈ << <  with j realizations, and shocks to nontradables TFP, 
which are in the set  {} 12 ... h zzz z ∈ <<<  with h realizations. Thus, the transition 
probability matrix of these shocks, ( ) 11 (,) | ( , ) TT
tt t t zz πε ε ++ , has dimensions (jxh)x(jxh). 
  
  When the model is solved assuming a frictionless credit market (i.e., without the credit 
constraint), the equilibrium relative price of nontradables is determined after the Bellman 
equation has been solved. In particular, the policy function b′(b,ε
T,z) and the resource 
constraints can be used to determine the equilibrium consumption allocations of tradables 
and nontradables, and the equilibrium price of nontradables follows from eq. (8).  
 
  The case with the credit constraint is more complicated because the equilibrium price of 
nontradables needs to be solved for together with the Bellman equation. The algorithm we 
use evaluates each candidate choice bB ′ ∈ for each triple in (b,ε
T,z) in the state space. A 
first pass assumes that the constraint does not bind, takes a particular set of values 
(b′,b,ε
T,z) and computes the corresponding c
T, c
N, m, and p
N that satisfy jointly the resource 
constraints and conditions (7)-(8). If the credit constraint does not bind, these solutions are 
passed on to the Bellman equation’s maximization step, which searches for the value-
maximizing choice of b′ in B. If the constraint binds, we take the corresponding “current” 
state triple (b,ε
T,z) and solve for b′,  c
T,  c
N,  m and p
N that satisfy jointly the resource 
constraints, conditions (7)-(8) and the credit constraint with equality. Note that this 
nonlinear simultaneous equation system yields, for a given triple (b,ε
T,z) and all bB ′ ∈  for 




  The baseline calibration parameters for the two-sector economy are listed in Table 5. 
Mendoza (2002) calibrated a model with tradables and nontradables for Mexico using 
                                          
9 It is straightforward, but lengthy, to show that the solution to the Bellman equation (14) 
corresponds to the competitive equilibrium. In particular, the solution satisfies the Euler equation 
(13), the resource constraints (10) and (11), the optimality conditions for demand of imported inputs 
(eq. (7)) and sectoral consumption allocations (eq. (8)). Note also that, when the credit constraint 
binds, the algorithm uses a pricing function for nontradables that does not depend on b′ .  
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sectoral data, and our calibration follows closely his. We keep the values γ=2, b=-0.44 and 
R=1.059 from the calibration of the one-sector model. The steady-state relative price of 







mm =1. Hence, the steady-state allocations can be 
interpreted as ratios relative to total GDP in units of tradables. We use the same elasticity-
of-substitution parameter as Mendoza’s, μ=0.316, which corresponds to an estimate for 
Mexico obtained by Ostry and Reinhart (1992). We also set several steady-state sectoral 
consumption and production ratios to match Mendoza’s averages obtained from Mexican 

















  The share of imported input costs to gross output of nontradables is α=0.2. In the 
deterministic steady state, this factor share yields a ratio of imported inputs to total GDP of 
13 percent, which matches the ratio for Mexico reported in Mendoza (2006b). With α=0.2 
and the GDP of nontradables calculated above, gross output of nontradables (i.e., 
nontradables GDP plus imported inputs) is equal to 0.71/(1-α)=0.758. It follows then that 
the trend level of TFP in nontradables is equal to Z=0.758
1-α/α
α=1.106 and then condition 
(7) implies that the steady-state level of imported inputs is m=(αZ)
1/(1-α)=0.152. 
 








mm)=0.71. Given these ratios and the values of tradables 
and nontradables GDP, it follows that c
T=0.261 and c
N=0.431. The value of the coefficient a 
in the CES aggregator is set so that p
N=1 given the values of μ, c
T, and c
N. This requires 
a=0.341. As in the one-sector model, we introduce constant lump-sum levels of exogenous 
absorption A
T and A
N to make the model consistent with the observed expenditure shares of 
investment and government expenditures. In addition, these transfers redistribute income 
across sectors so that the private sectoral consumption shares match those in the data. 
Hence, A
T is set so that the calibrated values of y
T, c
T, m, b and R are consistent with the 




N is set so 
that y
N and c





  The time preference elasticity in the UE setup is  ln( )/ln(1 ( , )) 0.1867 UE T N RC c c ρ =+ = . 
This implies the same steady-state subjective discount factor as in the one-sector model 
(0.944). In the BAH setup, we set φ =-0.7 and β=0.94395 (or  0.0594 BAH ρ = ) so as to match 
Mexico’s mean of net foreign assets and variability of aggregate consumption. 
 
  The data necessary to construct a reliable estimate of TFP shocks in the nontradables 
sector are not available. Hence we followed Mendoza (2006b) in using a two-stage 
“identification-by-simulation” strategy: In the first stage, we proxy TFP shocks in 
nontradables with nontradables GDP, and use THQA to construct a Markov process for ε
T 
and  z to approximate a VAR(1) estimated with the HP-filtered cyclical components of 
tradables and nontradables GDP from Mexican data for the 1965-2005 period. The 
nontradables sector is defined as services plus industry minus manufacturing. The VAR 
model is  1 tt t yy e ρ − = ⋅ +  where yt′=[yt
T yt
N ], ρ is a 2x2 matrix of autocorrelation coefficients, 
and et′=[et
T et
N ] is a vector of error terms with variance-covariance matrix cova(e). The 
estimates of ρ  and cova(e) are:  
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1.088 * 0.564 * 0.000601 0.000472
,c o v a ( )
0.000472 0.000572 0.655 * 0.154
e ρ
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ == ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
 (15) 
An asterisk denotes coefficients that are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level. Interestingly, the VAR results indicate that most of the persistence in the fluctuations 
of nontradables GDP follows from spillovers from tradables GDP (since the autocorrelation 
term for nontradables GDP is not significantly different from zero).  
 
  The unconditional standard deviations of tradables and nontradables output in the data 
are  0.0336 T y σ =  and  0.0327 N y σ = , the first-order autocorrelations are  0.575 T y ρ =  and 
0.603 N y ρ = , and the correlation between the two is  , 0.772 TN yy ρ = . Thus cyclical fluctuations 
in the output of the two sectors have similar magnitude and persistence, and they are 
positively correlated with each other. Passing the estimates in (15) to the TQHA program 
and using three realizations for ε
T and z (which imply 9 (ε
T,z) pairs) we obtain a Markov 
process that, after solving the model, produces standard deviations of 0.0301 and 0.0246 for 
GDP of tradables and nontradables
  respectively, with serial autocorrelations of 0.539 for 
tradables and 0.577 for nontradables, and correlation between the two equal to 0.791. Thus, 
using nontradables GDP as a proxy for nontradables TFP we obtained a Markov process 
that approximates well the actual cyclical behavior of each sector’s GDP, except that the 
variability of nontradables GDP (which is endogenous in the model) is underestimated—the 
model yields 2.46 percent instead of 3.27 percent in the data.  
 
  The second stage of the identification process adjusts the elements of ρ and cova(e) that 
involve nontradables TFP so as to produce a baseline simulation of the model that yields a 
closer approximation to the unconditional moments of tradables and nontradables GDP in 
the data (particularly the standard deviation of the latter). We leave unchanged the 
elements of ρ that were statistically significant in the results reported in (15). The closest 
approximation to the moments in the data produced the following unconditional moments: 
ˆ 0.0334 T y σ = ,  ˆ 0.0305 N y σ = ,  ˆ 0.587 T y ρ = ,  ˆ 0.483 N y ρ = , and  , ˆ 0.516 TN yy ρ = . The identifying 
restrictions that produced these results imply the following VAR structure for tradables 
GDP and nontradables TFP: 
 
0.000601 0.00055 1.088 0.564
,c o v a ( )
0.00055 0.0012 0.655 0.300
e ρ
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ == ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ − ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
 (16) 
3.4  Baseline Results 
 
  Table 7 reports the business cycle moments that characterize the stochastic steady state 
of the two-sector model with production under BAH and UE preferences. The table shows 
moments for foreign assets, the current account-output ratio, the price of nontradadables, 
imports of intermediate goods, and sectoral and aggregate consumption and output. 
Consumption of tradables is less volatile than tradables output, and consumption of 
nontradables, for which there is no storage technology that can be used to smooth 
consumption, is more volatile than nontradables output.  Aggregate consumption in units of 
tradables is less volatile than output (also in units of tradables) with UE preferences, but 
more volatile than output with BAH preferences. Both consumption and output in units of 
tradables are more volatile with BAH preferences than with UE preferences.   
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  In terms of matching key characteristics of actual business cycles, the two sector model 
improves upon the one-sector model in two important respects: First, it produces 
countercyclical fluctuations in the current account and net exports. The correlations of the 
current account-output ratio with output in units of tradables are -0.14 and -0.48 with UE 
and BAH preferences, respectively. Hence, agents in this model economy build up debt in 
the expansion phase of the business cycle, which is an important feature of the dynamics of 
debt observed in emerging economies. Second, the model is also in line with the data in 
predicting large, procyclical and persistent fluctuations in the relative price of nontradables 
(i.e., the real exchange rate). The coefficients of variation of the price of nontradables are 6.7 
and 8.1 percent with UE and BAH preferences respectively, more than twice the variability 
of output in units of tradables, and the correlations with output in units of tradables are 
0.75 and 0.88 respectively. The first-order autocorrelation of the price of nontradables is 
almost 0.5 with both preferences specifications.  
 
  The two-sector model is consistent with the one-sector model in predicting that 
precautionary savings are larger in the BAH setup than in the UE setup (25.3 percent of the 
long-run average of GDP in the former v. 1.6 percent in the latter). Moreover, comparing 
across the one-sector and two-sector models, the UE setup shows that precautionary savings 
are lower in the two-sector economy (2.5 percent in the one-sector model v. 1.6 percent in 
the two-sector model). Precautionary savings in the BAH one-sector and two-sector baseline 
economies are not easily comparable because they were calibrated with different values of φ. 
We show below, however, that when the comparison is made for common debt limits, the 
BAH setup also predicts that precautionary savings are generally smaller in the two-sector 
model than in the one-sector model. We will also show that this result is related to an 
implicit hedge provided by the equilibrium co-movement between the incomes from 
tradables and nontradables. 
 
3.5  Revisiting the Effects of Volatility and Financial Globalization on Foreign Assets    
 
  The conclusions derived from the one-sector model regarding the effects of business 
cycle volatility and financial globalization on foreign assets extend to the two-sector 
production economy. Increases in the volatility of tradables output and/or nontradables 
TFP can lead to large increases in the long-run average of foreign assets. However, the data 
do not show evidence of systematic volatility changes in this direction in Sudden Stop 
countries (in light of this and to save space we do not add tables and charts showing the 
results of our numerical analysis for the effects of volatility changes in the two-sector 
model). Table 3 shows that the volatility of tradables GDP increased in about half of the 
Sudden Stop countries, but only in five of them are the increases of the size that the model 
with either BAH or UE preferences would need to predict large changes in reserves. 
Volatility in the nontradables sector has increased only in a few of the Sudden Stop 
countries, with the median showing virtually no change. Hence, we conclude again that, 
while the model predicts that increases in output volatility could explain large increases in 
foreign asset positions, there is no systematic evidence in the data showing that output 
volatility has increased nearly as much the model would require, and in several countries it 
has fallen or remained about the same (particularly in the nontradables sector). 
 
  Figure 8 shows the effects of financial globalization on the long-run average of foreign 
assets and precautionary savings in the two-sector model with BAH and UE preferences. We  
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also include plots for the one-sector model for comparison. The two main results from the 
one-sector model are preserved: (1) financial globalization produces large increases in the 
foreign asset position, which increase at a linear rate with UE preferences, and at a sharply 
increasing rate in the BAH setup; (2) precautionary savings also rise at a fast increasing rate 
in the BAH setup while they are nearly invariant to the degree of financial globalization in 
the UE setup.  
 
  Comparing across one- and two-sector models we find that with BAH preferences both 
the long-run average of foreign assets and precautionary savings are uniformly smaller in the 
two-sector economy. With UE preferences, however, mean foreign assets are smaller in the 
one-sector model at levels of barriers to capital mobility equivalent to taxes of 10 percent or 
more. At lower taxes the one- and two-sector models with UE preferences predict about the 
same long-run averages of foreign assets. By contrast, precautionary savings are uniformly 
smaller in the two-sector UE setup. Despite these differences, the effects of financial 
globalization on mean foreign assets and precautionary saving remain large, particularly as 
financial globalization approaches the full removal of barriers to international asset trading.  
 
  The smaller precautionary savings effects in the two-sector model reflect the fact that 
the equilibrium correlation between tradables income and nontradables income valued at 
tradables goods prices is negative (at about -0.4 in both UE and BAH setups). Hence, when 
the economy suffers a negative shock to tradables GDP, the value of nontradables income 
rises providing an implicit hedge that reduces the need for precautionary savings. Since y
T 
and y
N are positively correlated, the negative correlation between y
T and p
Ny
N is driven by 
the negative correlations between the price of nontradables and the output of each sector. In 
turn, these price correlations depend on the elasticity of substitution between tradadables 
and nontradables in consumption and on the response of the supply of nontradable goods, 
which depends on technology parameters and the price of imported inputs.   
 
  In conclusion, in our two-sector model, financial globalization remains an important 
factor that could account for large increases in the foreign asset positions observed in 
Sudden Stop economies. In this case, however, the increases are less pronounced than in the 
one-sector model because the endogenous fluctuations in the price and output of notradables 
provide an implicit hedge that reduces the need for precautionary savings. 
  
3.6  Self-Insurance against Sudden Stops: How large should the war-chest be?    
 
  We move now to quantify the changes in precautionary demand for foreign assets 
induced by the introduction of Sudden Stop risk. We consider a baseline scenario in which 
the collateral constraint limits debt not to exceed 50 percent of GDP valued in units of 
tradables (κ=0.5). Table 7 shows the business cycle moments of the stochastic steady states 
under BAH and UE preferences. A standard finding from the debt-deflation models of 
Sudden Stops is that long-run business cycle statistics are not altered significantly by credit-
market imperfections. A comparison of the moments with and without credit constraints in 
Table 7 shows that this is the case here as well. Hence, the model’s endogenous Sudden 
Stops are infrequent (but positive probability) events nested within “normal” business 
cycles, and these business cycles are approximately the same as those that would be 
observed in the absence of credit constraints.   
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  In terms of the long-run average of foreign assets and precautionary savings, the long-
run average of assets in the BAH (UE) setup increases from -44.7 (-42.4) percent without 
Sudden Stop risk to -24.3 (-37.8) percent when Sudden Stops are possible. Since in the UE 
setup the deterministic stationary state of foreign assets is the same with or without credit 
constraints, precautionary savings with UE preferences increase by the same amount as the 
long-run average of foreign assets: -37.8-(-42.4)=4.6 percent. Thus, with UE preferences the 
risk of Sudden Stops leads to an increase in precautionary asset holdings of about 4.6 
percent of long-run GDP.  
 
  Quantifying the change in precautionary savings with BAH preferences is less obvious 
because the debt limit (which is also the debt to which the economy converges in the long 
run in the absence of uncertainty) changes from -0.7 without Sudden Stop risk to -0.5 with 
Sudden Stop risk. The long-run average of foreign assets rises 20.4 percentage points of GDP 
from one scenario to the other, but since the credit limit itself rises by 20 percentage points, 
the overall change in precautionary savings is only about ½ of a percentage point. Hence, 
relative to the corresponding credit limits, precautionary savings are about the same with or 
without Sudden Stop risk in the BAH setup. However, if we consider the build up of 
precautionary asset holdings from the perspective of an economy where Sudden Stop risk has 
just been introduced, the model predicts that agents would need to build up their war-chest 
of foreign assets by 20.4 percentage points of GDP in the long-run. This “transitional” 
measure of the extra precautionary savings that need to be accumulated as a result of the 
structural change implied by the introduction of Sudden Stop risk is perhaps a better 
measure of the effect that Sudden Stops have on self-insurance in the BAH setup. 
 
  Figure 9 illustrates Sudden Stop dynamics under the two preference specifications. The 
plots illustrate the amplification and persistence of the response of the model’s endogenous 
variables to shocks of standard magnitude when the credit constraint binds. To be precise, 
the plots show the differences in percent deviations from long-run averages in the economy 
with credit constraints relative to the economy with perfect credit markets in response to 
initial negative shocks to tradables output and nontradables TFP, and conditional on an 
initial debt ratio at which the credit constraint binds. The shocks are the pair (ε
T,z) in the 
Markov chain that yields the closest approximation to one-standard-deviation shocks.
10 The 
initial foreign asset position is -48.7 percent of long-run GDP. The probability of reaching 
this debt ratio in the long run is 0.9 (1.1) percent in the BAH (UE) setup.  
 
  The foreign assets plot illustrates the dynamics of precautionary savings. Initially, both 
BAH and UE setups show negative values because the initial foreign assets (-0.487) are 
smaller than the corresponding long-run averages by a larger gap when credit constraints are 
present than when they are absent. In the UE setup the gap is about -4 percentage points of 
GDP initially, while in the BAH setup the gap is nearly five times larger in absolute value. 
This result reflects the smaller change in mean foreign assets relative to perfect credit 
markets in the UE setup. In terms of persistence, foreign assets take a long time to converge. 
In the BAH setup, a gap of about -4 percentage points of GDP still remains after 50 years. 
In contrast, the negative gap closes in about 5 years in the UE setup, but after that the gap 
                                          
10 Since the discrete Markov chain is not a perfect approximation, the shocks are equivalent to 1.25 
and 1.05 times the standard deviation of tradables output and nontradables TFP respectively.   
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climbs to 1.5 percent and returns to zero very slowly. This moderate “overshooting” of the 
asset position is an implication of the endogenous rate of time preference. 
 
  The plots for the current account-output ratio, nontradables consumption, the price of 
nontradables, aggregate consumption and total output in units of tradables illustrate the 
ability of the debt-deflation mechanism to produce endogenous Sudden Stops in response to 
one-standard-deviation shocks. Qualitatively, the features of the Sudden Stops are identical 
in the BAH and UE setups: a current account reversal, a collapse in the price of 
nontradables, and declines in sectoral and aggregate consumption and output, all of which 
represent amplified responses to the shocks induced by the Fisherian debt deflation. 
Quantitatively, the BAH setup produces larger Sudden Stops than the UE setup. In the 
BAH (UE) setup, the current account reversal reaches 3.5 (2.5) percentage points of GDP, 
the fall in nontradables output is about 2.5 (1.5) percent, the real depreciation is 9 (6) 
percent, the decline in aggregate consumption is 5 (3) percent and the drop in output is 7 
(5) percent.  
 
  The transitional dynamics in Figure 9 show that Sudden Stop economies can go through 
prolonged periods in which they build up foreign assets, display persistent current account 
surpluses, and maintain undervalued real exchange rates, and these “imbalances” grow 
smaller gradually over time. The qualitative features of this adjustment are consistent with 
the recent experience of several Sudden Stop countries, particularly in Asia. Moreover, the 
current account surplus and undervalued real exchange rate are by-products of the build up 
of precautionary savings in the aftermath of Sudden Stops, or following financial 
globalization. They do not require intentional exchange rate management by central banks.     
 
  The plots in Figure 9 illustrate Sudden Stops from a particular initial condition of 
foreign assets (i.e. -48.7 percent of long-run GDP). There are many other debt positions, 
however, that also trigger Sudden Stops. Figure 10 shows the current account reversals and 
price collapses that occur on impact when negative one-standard-deviation ε
T and z shocks 
hit the economy at different initial conditions of foreign assets. For values of b ≥ -0.482, the 
credit constraint does not bind and hence there is zero amplification and no Sudden Stops. 
For -0.578<b <-0.482, the constraint binds and there are Sudden Stops. This Sudden Stop 
region can be split into two parts. One part includes Sudden Stops that are so large (with 
current account reversals of up to 100 percentage points of GDP) that precautionary savings 
rules them out in the long run. In Figure 10, this part of the Sudden Stop region is defined 
by foreign asset positions to the left of the long-run probability borders of the UE and BAH 
setups (which are located at about the 50 percent debt ratio in both cases). The second part 
of the Sudden Stop region is on the right side of these borders. This is the “long-run Sudden 
Stop region,” where there are Sudden Stops with positive long-run probability. This region 
includes the case illustrated in Figure 9 as well as other Sudden Stop episodes that produce 
effects more than twice as large.
11 The cumulative probability of all long-run Sudden Stop 
states is 3.88 (7.85) percent in the BAH (UE) setup. 
 
                                          
11 The initial condition b/y=-0.487 used in Fig. 9 is almost at the border of the long-run Sudden Stop 
region with the region where the credit constraint does not bind, so it produces a relatively moderate 
Sudden Stop (which is also closer to the magnitudes observed in the data).  
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  Once the economy hits a debt position at which standard shocks trigger a Sudden Stop, 
how long does it take for precautionary accumulation of foreign assets to provide enough 
self-insurance to minimize the probability of returning to that debt position? The answer to 
this question is illustrated in Figure 11. This figure plots the transitional CDFs of foreign 
assets for the BAH and UE setups starting from the initial asset position that generated the 
Sudden Stop shown in Figure 9 (-48.7 percent of GDP). The probability of reaching this 
debt ratio is minimized when the economy reaches the stochastic steady state (as noted 
before, the long-run probabilities of b=-0.487 are 1.1 and 0.9 percent in the UE and BAH 
setups respectively). The CDF plots for the BAH and UE setups show that this process 
takes more than 15 years. After two years, the probability of hitting again the -48.7 percent 
debt ratio is 21 percent in the UE setup and 40 percent in the BAH setup. After 15 years, 
the probability is 3.4 percent in the UE setup and 4.7 percent in the BAH setup. Thus, the 
model predicts that, while precautionary savings provide substantial self-insurance to reduce 
the probability of Sudden Stops sharply in the long run, the process of building this war-
chest of assets is long and gradual. 
 
4.       Conclusions 
 
  This paper examines the recent surge in foreign reserves in Sudden Stop countries from 
the perspective of a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium framework of optimal 
precautionary demand for foreign assets in a small open economy. The framework allows for 
two formulations of preferences with different implications for self-insurance behavior (the 
Bewley-Aiygari-Hugget setup and the Uzawa-Epstein setup). We use this framework to 
study a one-sector endowment economy and a two-sector production economy with “liability 
dollarization” (i.e., debt denominated in units of tradables but leveraged partly on the 
income from the nontradables sector). The two-sector model features a credit constraint that 
produces endogenous Sudden Stops driven by Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism. The 
constraint limits debt not to exceed a fraction of total income in units of tradables. When 
the constraint binds, the price and income of the nontradables sector collapse and this 
reduces further the agents’ ability to borrow. As a result, the responses of macroeconomic 
variables to shocks of standard magnitude show significant amplification and persistence.   
 
  The self-insurance framework studied in this paper features three key mechanisms that 
drive precautionary demand for foreign assets: increases in the cyclical volatility of output, 
international financial integration, and Sudden Stop risk. Our quantitative analysis shows 
that all three mechanisms can produce large changes in foreign asset holdings. Output 
volatility cannot explain the observed surge in reserves, however, because output volatility 
has not increased in Sudden Stop countries. By contrast, financial integration and Sudden 
Stop risk produce large increases in foreign asset holdings that are comparable to observed 
surges in reserves, and the data do show that the process of far-reaching financial 
globalization and the emergence of Sudden Stop risk coincided with the build up of reserves.  
 
  We also found that the adjustments in foreign assets and key macroeconomic aggregates 
triggered by financial globalization and Sudden Stop risk follow a protracted and gradual 
process. This process features persistent current account surpluses and undervalued real 
exchange rates that are reverted slowly. The probability of Sudden Stops declines slowly, as 
it takes over 50 years to attain its minimum level in the long run. Financial globalization 
also progresses in nonlinear fashion in the economy with BAH preferences. In its early  
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stages, large changes in barriers to global asset trading produce small changes in foreign 
asset positions, but as a regime of perfect capital mobility is approached, small changes in 
restrictions affecting global asset markets produce large changes in asset positions. 
 
  The two-sector production economy has interesting implications for business cycle co-
movements and precautionary savings. The model yields countercyclical fluctuations in the 
current account and net exports, and large, persistent fluctuations in the real exchange rate. 
In addition, the model features an implicit hedging mechanism because tradables income and 
nontradables income in units of tradables are negatively correlated at equilibrium. Hence, 
when an adverse, non-diversifiable shock hits tradables income, the value of nontradables 
income rises, and the higher consumption of nontradables offsets some of the adverse effect 
of the fall in tradables income. As a result, the buffer stocks of assets implied by 
precautionary savings are smaller in the two-sector model than in the one-sector model.   
This outcome, however, depends on the elasticity of substitution between tradables and 
nontradables in consumption, and on features of preferences and technology that drive the 
equilibrium of the market of nontradables. 
 
  One caveat of our analysis of financial globalization is that we abstract from efficiency 
gains. If an emerging economy that opens the capital account has relatively little capital, its 
marginal return will be high and this would trigger an investment boom that gives an 
incentive to borrow instead of saving. The investment boom, however, should not be directly 
attributed to financial integration but to the removal of distortions on capital accumulation. 
Mendoza and Tesar (1998) and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) showed that the efficiency 
and welfare gains of removing these distortions, even when the economy is in financial 
autarky, are much larger than the extra gains that result from the shift from financial 
autarky to financial globalization. A second caveat is that we did not consider the possibility 
of sovereign default. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006) showed, however, that given the choice of a 
portfolio of “defaultable debt” and reserve assets, the optimal choice is to hold zero reserves. 
Hence, default considerations do not seem useful for explaining the surge in reserves. 
 
  Precautionary demand for foreign assets arises from distortions on financial markets 
(incomplete insurance markets, credit constraints, etc.), and hence it is suboptimal from a 
normative standpoint. This raises two important normative questions that we did not 
address in this paper: What are the welfare costs that result from these distortions? And, 
are there policy strategies that can yield outcomes sufficiently superior, relative to 
precautionary savings under the status quo, to outweigh their implementation costs?  
  
  Results in the literature shed some light on these questions. On one hand, the classic 
Lucas result showing that the welfare cost of consumption volatility in representative-agent 
models with CRRA utility is negligible, regardless of the asset market structure and as long 
as growth and business cycles are unrelated, suggests that the overall welfare cost of 
precautionary savings should be small. Indeed, international Real-Business-Cycle models 
predict that the cost of moving from perfect world capital markets to financial autarky is 
negligible on average over the long run. On the other hand, Durdu and Mendoza (2006) 
showed that welfare costs conditional on a Sudden Stop state are high. They also found, 
however, that attempting to prevent these Sudden Stops with a credit facility that aims to 
defuse the debt-deflation process can result in distortions with even larger costs, unless the 
facility functions with a complex state-contingent policy. Caballero and Panageas (2006)  
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showed that precautionary savings can be highly undesirable for emerging economies that 
hope to attain higher long-run growth rates, and in this case arrangements that can provide 
financing when Sudden Stops hit are welfare-improving. 
 
  If we move away from the representative-agent paradigm, the costs of precautionary 
savings and financial globalization for countries with underdeveloped financial systems can 
be large, and distributed regressively across the population (see Mendoza et al. (2007)). The 
best policy response is to promote the development of domestic financial systems in 
emerging economies. Beyond this obvious response, the class of policy recommendations that 
are effective for dealing with the adverse distributional implications of financial globalization 
without financial development are yet to be identified.  
 
  In the final analysis, we conclude that the argument behind the New Merchantilism is 
only partially correct. On one hand, our findings do show that the aim to minimize Sudden 
Stop risk can lead to a surge in foreign asset holdings. On the other hand, the New 
Merchantilism cannot be defended by arguing that business cycle volatility has increased, 
because this is not observed in the data. The New Mechantilism also fails inasmuch as 
frameworks like ours, or the one developed by Mendoza et al (2007), predict that financial 
globalization can be a strong driving force of the rise in reserves. Self-insurance behavior is 
part of the mechanism by which globalization affects foreign asset holdings in these models, 
but this is unrelated to a desire to build a war-chest for defense against Sudden Stops. 
Instead, it is a consequence of the removal of barriers to global asset trading given the 
underdevelopment of the financial markets that agents in Sudden Stop economies can access.  
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Table 1.  International Reserve Position in Sudden Stop Economies 
1/
(Percent of GDP)





Argentina I 1994 3.20 8.62 5.42
Argentina II 2001 5.04 11.54 6.51
Brazil 1998 4.36 7.65 3.30
Chile 1998 16.93 20.49 3.57
Colombia 1998 9.24 12.21 2.97
Ecuador 1999 7.35 3.89 -3.46
Hong Kong 1998 34.16 68.85 34.69
Indonesia 1997 6.53 18.69 12.17
Korea 1997 5.03 21.26 16.23
Mexico 1994 4.64 7.29 2.65
Malaysia 1997 25.18 39.54 14.36
Pakistan 1998 1.90 8.51 6.61
Peru 1998 9.25 16.66 7.41
Philippines 1997 6.05 16.69 10.65
Russia 1998 3.05 12.46 9.41
Thailand 1997 14.84 28.01 13.17
Turkey 2001 5.67 13.57 7.90
Uruguay 2002 7.18 20.06 12.87
Median 6.29 15.12 7.66
Median Asian Countries 6.53 21.26 13.17
Source:  Authors' calculations
1/ Refers to the emerging market economies that experienced a sudden stop during the
past two-decades.  
2/ We include Sudden Stop episodes that are included in various empirical studies of 
Sudden Stops, such as Calvo, et. al. (2004), Cavallo and Frankel (2004), and Rothenberg
and Warnock (2006).
3/ Covers the period since 1985 to the year before the sudden stop.
4/ Covers the period since the year after the sudden stop till 2004.   
 
Table 2.   Business Cycles and Financial Globalization













United States 1.90 2.38 1.57 1.52 0.89 0.83 0.98 0.85
United Kingdom 1.90 2.01 2.00 1.01 1.21 1.15 1.28 0.90
France 1.22 1.13 1.49 0.76 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.99
G e r m a n y 1 . 6 82 . 0 21 . 5 11 . 3 4 0 . 9 41 . 0 20 . 7 71 . 3 2
J a p a n 2 . 6 23 . 2 91 . 9 81 . 6 6 0 . 7 00 . 6 80 . 7 20 . 9 5
Mean Industrial Countries 2.14 2.33 2.10 1.11 1.03 1.08 1.00 1.08




A r g e n t i n a 5 . 4 83 . 4 67 . 2 00 . 4 8 1 . 6 83 . 4 41 . 0 03 . 4 5
B r a z i l 4 . 1 45 . 2 82 . 7 01 . 9 5 1 . 3 40 . 9 92 . 3 00 . 4 3
Chile 4.88 6.79 2.98 2.28 1.98 1.95 1.46 1.34
Colombia 2.26 2.33 2.47 0.94 1.23 1.00 1.34 0.74
E c u a d o r 3 . 1 53 . 9 32 . 6 21 . 5 0 0 . 8 90 . 8 90 . 8 71 . 0 3
Mexico 3.27 3.67 3.06 1.20 1.14 0.99 1.38 0.72
Peru 5.19 3.51 7.13 0.49 1.03 0.77 1.00 0.77
Uruguay 5.45 6.48 5.25 1.24 1.29 1.17 1.41 0.84
Hong Kong 3.50 3.78 3.12 1.21 1.09 1.20 1.08 1.11
I n d o n e s i a 4 . 1 12 . 8 15 . 3 20 . 5 3 1 . 5 12 . 5 11 . 1 22 . 2 5
K o r e a 3 . 1 93 . 3 62 . 9 01 . 1 6 1 . 2 41 . 1 01 . 5 30 . 7 2
Malaysia 3.54 2.64 4.66 0.57 1.61 1.75 1.54 1.13
Pakistan 2.18 2.63 1.72 1.53 2.25 2.39 1.76 1.36
Philippines 3.33 4.16 2.88 1.44 0.54 0.52 0.58 0.89
Thailand 4.23 2.44 5.97 0.41 1.03 1.09 1.02 1.07
Turkey 3.52 3.40 4.06 0.84 1.43 1.13 1.60 0.71
Mean SSC 3.84 3.79 4.00 1.11 1.33 1.43 1.31 1.16
Median SSC 3.53 3.48 3.09 1.18 1.26 1.12 1.36 0.96
Mean EME's 3.77 3.75 3.64 1.03 1.30 1.42 1.26 1.12
Median EME's 3.53 3.57 3.09 1.15 1.27 1.18 1.19 0.99
Source:  Authors' calculations.  Pre-Globalization and Globalization refer to the 1966-1985 and 1986-2005 periods, respectively.
1/ See Table 1 for a definition of sudden stop countries.   
 
Table 3.   Sectoral  Volatility and Financial Globalization













United States 3.93 4.52 3.50 1.29 1.47 1.30 1.62 0.81
United Kingdom 4.91 6.43 3.54 1.81 2.07 2.37 1.81 1.30
France 4.19 4.97 3.62 1.37 1.24 0.88 1.48 0.60
G e r m a n y 2 . 8 22 . 5 43 . 0 70 . 8 3 1 . 4 41 . 5 71 . 3 81 . 1 4
J a p a n 3 . 6 84 . 0 63 . 7 51 . 0 8 2 . 5 13 . 2 31 . 6 81 . 9 2
Mean Industrial Countries 3.39 3.68 3.25 1.13 1.03 1.08 1.00 1.08




A r g e n t i n a 5 . 4 83 . 9 36 . 9 20 . 5 7 5 . 2 43 . 8 16 . 5 40 . 5 8
B r a z i l 4 . 4 44 . 5 04 . 3 91 . 0 2 4 . 0 34 . 8 53 . 1 21 . 5 5
Chile 5.99 . 5.99 . 3.74 . 3.74 .
Colombia 4.82 2.83 6.34 0.45 3.15 2.21 3.99 0.55
E c u a d o r 6 . 8 04 . 7 48 . 6 00 . 5 5 5 . 4 55 . 8 05 . 0 71 . 1 4
Mexico 3.36 3.07 3.70 0.83 3.27 3.53 3.00 1.18
Peru 5.74 4.72 7.38 0.64 5.05 3.32 6.94 0.48
Uruguay 5.98 6.41 6.46 0.99 5.80 6.88 5.59 1.23
Hong Kong 5.33 . 5.33 . 2.06 . 2.06 .
I n d o n e s i a 3 . 0 22 . 5 53 . 5 60 . 7 2 5 . 3 03 . 9 16 . 7 40 . 5 8
K o r e a 4 . 5 95 . 1 14 . 1 71 . 2 2 2 . 7 92 . 7 42 . 8 40 . 9 7
Malaysia 4.17 3.33 4.81 0.69 4.58 3.23 5.28 0.61
Pakistan 2.62 3.27 2.22 1.47 2.49 3.02 1.47 2.06
Philippines 3.08 3.78 2.74 1.38 3.98 5.06 3.25 1.56
Thailand 4.03 2.88 5.42 0.53 4.76 2.96 6.59 0.45
Turkey 3.44 3.12 3.75 0.83 3.72 4.06 3.50 1.16
Mean SSC 4.56 3.87 5.11 0.85 4.09 3.95 4.36 1.01
Median SSC 4.52 3.56 5.07 0.77 4.00 3.67 3.87 1.06
Mean EME's 4.51 4.04 4.82 0.84 4.22 4.37 3.67 1.19
Median EME's 4.43 3.78 4.28 0.88 3.93 3.91 3.38 1.16
Source:  Authors' calculations.  Pre-Globalization and Globalization refer to the 1966-1985 and 1986-2005 periods, respectively.
1/ See Table 1 for a definition of sudden stop countries.   
 














United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
United Kingdom 1.00 0.85 1.27 1.36 1.18 1.66
France 0.64 0.47 0.95 0.69 0.54 0.92
Germany 0.88 0.85 0.96 0.93 1.05 0.76
Japan 1.38 1.38 1.26 1.07 1.14 0.93
Mean Industrial Countries 1.13 0.98 1.34 1.03 1.08 1.00
Median Industrial Countries 1.00 0.85 1.21 0.99 1.11 0.96
EME
Sudden Stop Countries 
1/
Argentina 2.88 1.45 4.59 5.42 6.04 4.68
Brazil 2.18 2.22 1.72 3.25 2.65 4.04
Chile 2.56 2.86 1.90 5.67 6.71 2.83
Colombia 1.19 0.98 1.57 1.63 1.18 2.16
Ecuador 1.66 1.65 1.67 1.65 1.77 1.48
Mexico 1.72 1.54 1.95 2.18 1.85 2.74
Peru 2.73 1.48 4.54 3.13 1.37 4.63
Uruguay 2.86 2.73 3.35 4.12 3.86 4.80
Hong Kong 1.84 1.59 1.99 2.25 2.30 2.20
Indonesia 2.16 1.18 3.39 3.65 3.58 3.86
Korea 1.68 1.41 1.85 2.32 1.88 2.89
Malaysia 1.86 1.11 2.97 3.35 2.35 4.68
Pakistan 1.14 1.11 1.10 2.88 3.20 1.97
Philippines 1.75 1.75 1.84 1.05 1.09 1.08
Thailand 2.23 1.03 3.81 2.57 1.35 3.97
Turkey 1.85 1.43 2.59 2.96 1.96 4.24
Mean SSC 2.02 1.59 2.55 3.00 2.70 3.27
Median SSC 1.86 1.47 1.97 2.92 2.13 3.37
Mean EME's 1.98 1.58 2.32 2.93 2.68 2.90
Median EME's 1.86 1.50 1.97 2.80 2.25 2.78
Source:  Authors' calculations.  Pre-Globalization and Globalization refer to the 1966-1985 and 1986-2005 periods, 
respectively.
1/ See Table 1 for a definition of sudden stop countries.   
 
Table 5.  Calibration of the one- and
two-sector models.
Notation Parameter/Variable Value
1.  One-sector model
ρ
BAH Rate of time preference in the BAH setup 0.064
ρ
UE Rate of time preference elasticity in the UE setup 0.109
γ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 2.000
ϖ Ad-hoc debt limit  -0.510
R Gross world interest rate 1.059
y Mean output 1.000
c Consumption-output ratio 0.692
b Net foreign assets-output ratio -0.440
σ e Standard deviation of output innovations 0.026
θy Autocorrelation of output 0.597
A Lump-sum absorption 0.282
2.  Two-sector model
ρ
BAH Rate of time preference in the BAH setup 0.059
ρ
UE Rate of time preference elasticity in the UE setup 0.187
γ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 2.000
µ Elasticity of substitution 0.316
a CES weight of tradable consumption 0.341
ϖ Ad-hoc debt limit -0.700
α Share of imported inputs 0.200
R Gross world interest rate 1.059
b Net foreign assets-output ratio -0.440
p
N Relative price of nontradables 1.000
p




N Output in units of tradables 1.000
c
T/y
T Tradable consumption-output ratio 0.665
c
N/y




T Nontradable-tradable output ratio 1.543
A
T Lump-sum absorption of tradables 0.106
A
N Lump-sum absorption of nontradables 0.176
Note: BAH refers to Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget, UE refers to Uzawa-Epstein. CES refers to constant-
elasticity of substitution.   
 
Table 6. Statistiscal Moments of the Stochastic Stationary State 
of the One-Sector Economy
UE BAH UE BAH UE BAH UE BAH UE BAH
Precautionary savings
 1/ 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.24
Means
Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
C o n s u m p t i o n 0 . 6 90 . 6 90 . 6 90 . 7 00 . 7 00 . 7 00 . 6 90 . 6 90 . 7 00 . 7 0
Foreign assets -0.42 -0.42 -0.41 -0.39 -0.39 -0.30 -0.43 -0.46 -0.34 -0.28
Trade balance 
2/ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Discount  factor 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Coefficients of variation (in 
percent)
Output 3.28 3.28 3.63 3.63 4.97 4.97 2.49 2.49 3.28 3.28
C o n s u m p t i o n 3 . 1 33 . 2 63 . 9 23 . 9 24 . 7 24 . 6 62 . 3 82 . 5 94 . 1 13 . 1 1
Foreign assets 24.41 10.11 29.73 13.39 36.97 20.28 18.52 6.33 40.92 20.10
Current account
 2/ 2.68 2.02 2.77 2.08 4.08 3.42 2.03 1.40 2.81 2.48
Trade balance 
2/ 3.04 2.11 3.27 2.23 4.62 3.66 2.30 1.44 3.72 2.78
Discount factor 0.14 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.18 0.00
Normalized coefficients of 
variation (relative to output)
C o n s u m p t i o n 0 . 9 50 . 9 91 . 0 81 . 0 80 . 9 50 . 9 40 . 9 61 . 0 41 . 2 50 . 9 5
Foreign assets 7.43 3.08 8.19 3.69 7.43 4.08 7.44 2.55 12.46 6.12
Current account
 2/ 0.82 0.62 0.76 0.57 0.82 0.69 0.82 0.56 0.86 0.75
Trade balance 
2/ 0.92 0.64 0.90 0.61 0.93 0.74 0.93 0.58 1.13 0.85
Discount factor 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.00
Output correlations
C o n s u m p t i o n 0 . 4 20 . 7 50 . 4 80 . 7 80 . 4 20 . 6 70 . 4 20 . 8 10 . 2 60 . 5 4
Foreign assets 0.32 0.56 0.34 0.53 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.62 0.19 0.33
Current account
 2/ 0.97 0.85 0.97 0.83 0.97 0.89 0.97 0.81 0.99 0.93
Trade balance 
2/ 0.76 0.70 0.68 0.63 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.67 0.66 0.74
Discount factor -0.42 0.00 -0.48 0.00 -0.42 0.00 -0.42 0.00 -0.26 0.00
Autocorrelations
Output 0.59 0.59 0.69 0.69 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
C o n s u m p t i o n 0 . 9 70 . 8 40 . 9 70 . 8 80 . 9 70 . 8 80 . 9 70 . 8 10 . 9 90 . 9 3
Foreign assets 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.94 1.00 0.99
Current account
 2/ 0.57 0.51 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.54 0.57 0.49 0.59 0.56
Trade balance 
2/ 0.67 0.55 0.76 0.67 0.67 0.59 0.67 0.52 0.76 0.64
Discount factor 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.99 0.00
Source:  Authors' calculations.
1/ Precautionary savings are measured as defined in the text. 
2/ Current account and trade balance are measured in percent of output.
Risk Aver. 5.0 Baseline Auto Corr 0.7 Std Dev. 5% Std Dev. 2.5%
  
 
Table 7.  Statistical Moments of the Stochastic Stationary State
of the Two-Sector Economy
Econ w/ perfect 
credit markets
Econ w/ binding 
credit constraints
Econ w/ perfect 
credit markets
Econ w/ binding 
credit constraints
Precautionary savings
 1/ 0.02 0.06 0.25 0.26
Means
Consumption of tradables 0.262 0.264 0.261 0.269
Consumption of  nontradables 0.431 0.432 0.430 0.435
Consumption 0.360 0.362 0.359 0.366
Price of nontradables 1.005 1.011 1.003 1.027
Net foreign assets -0.424 -0.378 -0.447 -0.243
Current Account-GDP ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tradables GDP 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393
GDP in units of tradables 1.002 1.006 1.000 1.019
Nontradables GDP 0.607 0.608 0.606 0.610
Imported input 0.152 0.153 0.152 0.156
Coefficients of variation (in 
percent)
Consumption of tradables 1.643 1.523 3.139 2.993
Consumption of  nontradables 5.369 5.379 4.926 4.896
Consumption 3.626 3.634 3.169 3.109
Price of nontradables 6.622 6.550 8.099 8.053
Net foreign assets 19.824 16.436 42.960 76.574
Current Account-GDP ratio 1.453 1.416 1.950 1.939
Tradables GDP 3.345 3.345 3.345 3.345
GDP in units of tradables 2.213 2.184 3.292 3.271
Nontradables GDP 3.050 3.059 2.797 2.793
Imported input 3.805 3.688 5.846 5.754
Correlation with GDP
Consumption of tradables 0.374 0.341 0.804 0.803
Consumption of  nontradables -0.579 -0.579 -0.562 -0.591
Consumption -0.471 -0.482 -0.247 -0.293
Price of nontradables 0.749 0.740 0.867 0.873
Net foreign assets 0.266 0.151 0.437 0.408
Current Account-GDP ratio -0.141 -0.142 -0.474 -0.497
Nontradables GDP -0.579 -0.579 -0.562 -0.591
Imported input 0.833 0.826 0.929 0.931
First-order autocorrelation
Consumption of tradables 0.961 0.920 0.908 0.897
Consumption of  nontradables 0.483 0.484 0.505 0.502
Consumption 0.528 0.525 0.663 0.650
Price of nontradables 0.460 0.451 0.489 0.485
Net foreign assets 0.985 0.974 0.995 0.994
Current Account-GDP ratio 0.489 0.477 0.456 0.455
Tradables GDP 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.587
GDP in units of tradables 0.674 0.653 0.673 0.660
Nontradables GDP 0.483 0.484 0.505 0.502
Imported input 0.514 0.484 0.577 0.565
Source:  Authors' calculations.
1/ Precautionary savings are measured as defined in the text. 
Baseline
UE BAH
 Figure 1. Emerging Market Economies:  Financial Integration
Source: Authors' calculations. 































80Figure 2. Output and Consumption Volatiliy:  Sample of Countries
(Percent)
Source: Authors' calculations
Pre-Globalization and globalization refer to the 1966-1985 and 1986-2005 periods, respectively.  See 
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2 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Long-run distributionFigure 5.  One-Sector Model: Transitional Dynamics of Foreign Assets
(As percent of GDP.  Forecast functions conditional on lowest positive
probability asset position and neutral shocks at date 1).























Uzawa-Epstein Bewley-Aiyagari-HuggetFigure 6.  Effects of Variability & Persistence of Output on




















































































 B. PersistenceFigure 7. One-Sector Model: Financial Globalization, Foreign Assets,
 and Precautionary Savings
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget: NDL Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget: ADL=-2
Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget:ADL=-1.0 Uzawa-Epstein
Right AxisFigure 8. One- and Two-Sector Models: Financial Globalization, Foreign Assets 
and Precautionary Savings.
Source: Authors' calculations.
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BAH two sectors:ADL=-1.0 BAH one sector:ADL=-1
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Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget Preferences Uzawa-Epstein Preferences
Figure 9. Sudden Stops under Alternative Preference Specifications
(excess deviations from long run average relative to frictionless economy)
Foreign Assets Current Account-Output Ratio
Output of Nontradables Price of Nontradables
CES Consumption Total Output in Units of Tradables
Note: The plots show forecast functions of equilibrium Markov processes in response to initial negative shocks to tradables
output and TFP in nontradables, and an initial ratio of foreign assets to long-run GDP of -48.7 percent. The data are
plotted as differences in percent deviations from long-run averages in the economies with credit constraints relative to those


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































nFigure 11.  Transitional Cumulative Distributions in the Binding Economy
Source: Authors' calculations.
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2 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Long-run distribution